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Immigrant Liberal Republicans 
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Alison Clark Efford 
0 n February 20, 1872, future president James A. Garfield wrote in his diary that Senator Carl Schurz had just made "the most brilliant senato-rial speech of his life."1 That was no small compliment, given Schurz's 
renown as an orator. He had begun public speaking in 1848, rousing restive Ger-
mans as a student revolutionary. When the uprisings failed the following year, 
he moved to the United States, where he quickly learned English and went on to 
much greater acclaim. Abraham Lincoln praised his work on the stump in 1860, 
rewarding him first with a position as United States minister to Spain and later 
with a commission as a brigadier general in the Union army.2 After the Civil 
War, Schurz turned his rhetorical talents to the cause of black suffrage. It was as 
a Radical Republican as well as a leader of German Americans that Schurz was 
selected to represent Missouri in the Senate in 1869. 
Although historians of Reconstruction are familiar with Schurz's career, the 
performance that caught Garfield's eye in 1872 usually escapes their attention.3 
Schurz was demanding an investigation into the War Department's sale in 1870 
and 1871 of surplus rifles to E. Remington & Sons, a New York firm under con-
tract with the French government. In anticipation of a good afternoon's enter-
tainment, foreign diplomats, residents of the capital city, and representatives 
from the House crowded into the Senate chamber. With the galleries packed to 
capacity, senators passed a motion to allow women to listen from the cloakrooms, 
and when that proved insufficient, the spectators squeezed onto the floor, flank-
ing Vice President Schuyler Colfax.4 According to the Chicago Tribune, Schurz's 
speech elicited "an interest and an attendance almost unprecedented in the re-
cent history of Senatorial debates:•s 
Schurz's audience listened attentively for three hours while he accused the 
War Department of violating American law regarding neutrality and breach-
ing the statutes governing the drawdown of U.S. armories.6 He exhibited a firm 
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command of the details of a complicated case-proxy buyers and specially 
manufactured ammunition added to the intrigue7-while driving home a few 
main points. The neutral status of the United States was at issue because the 
transactions had occurred at the height of the Franco-Prussian War, which ar-
rayed all of the German states except Austria against their longtime enemy to 
the west. A few days before the big speech, Schurz had quoted a petition sent 
to him in the winter of 1870-71 by a group of immigrants who had complained 
that American weapons were "killing our brothers and relatives:'8 Now he 
stressed that all Americans should be worried if "this great American Republic 
of ours understands and interprets her good faith and her neutral duties only 
upon a strictly cash principle!"9 It would have been bad enough if all the profits 
had gone into government coffers, but Schurz suspected that bribery was be-
hind the abuses. 
The arms scandal was one of many such· exposes in the era of Credit Mo-
bilier, "Boss" William M. Tweed, and the Whiskey Ring, but it stood apart in 
injecting immigrant politics and international comparisons into the Liberal 
Republican critique of the administration of Ulysses S. Grant.10 Schurz's pub-
lic condemnation of the arms deal drew meaning from changing patterns of 
German-American self-identification during the period of the Franco-Prussian 
War and German unification, and it represented new ideas about how the United 
States related to-and compared with-other countries. As essays in this volume 
by Caleb Richardson and Julia Brookins also show, immigrants had interests 
quite particular to their position in the United States, but they maintained emo-
tional ties to their homelands and brought transnational perspectives to the often 
illiberal and violent project of creating, defending, and governing nation-states.11 
Schurz had previously held German governments up as negative examples, but 
he now accompanied his censures of American behavior with admiring descrip-
tions of certain aspects of German administration. Simultaneously, he pushed 
to professionalize the American civil service along the lines of its British and 
Prussian counterparts. Approaching this international scandal with attention 
to German-American politics facilitates a recasting of the Liberal Republican 
movement and the political culture of the 1870s in general. 
Historians agree that although the Liberal Republicans were unsuccessful in 
unseating Grant in 1872, their campaign to limit the federal government, reform 
the civil service, and reconcile northern and southern whites held profound im-
plications.12 Liberal Republican · proposals would of course affect the status of 
African Americans in the South, the concern around which Reconstruction his-
toriography has revolved. Several historians have disputed the idea that racism 
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was the movement's driving force, observing that leading Liberal Republicans 
expressed no more hostility toward African Americans than their Republican 
adversaries and that Liberal Republicans generally appreciated the achievement 
of formal equality before the law.13 The new party's leaders did, however, associ-
ate black voters with corruption and what they deemed excessive government 
involvement in the economy. Such prejudices were evident in their conservative 
misgivings about governance under Grant and their forward-looking interest in 
expert-led reform.14 In reality, it is difficult to isolate racism from other motives. 
Explaining the Liberal Republican movement therefore requires recapturing the 
subtle reordering of priorities that defined a group that coalesced, briefly, in op-
position to another party then identified with African American rights. 
Examining the arms scandal contributes to the task of explaining the Lib-
eral Republican shift by positioning it internationally. The reform ethos of the 
Liberal Republicans heralded a new style of transnational comparison in which 
Americans became more comfortable drawing political inspiration from Euro-
pean sources. It also partook of the rising interest in administration around the 
world. Informed by their optimism for the future of the German Empire, the im-
migrants whom Schurz represented took up the issue of exemplary bureaucracy 
with a gusto that opened the way for the subordination of black voting rights as 
a political priority.15 
For scholars interested in understanding the United States in a transnational 
perspective, German-American Liberal Republicans help bridge the historio-
graphical gap between the antislavery Forty-Eighters-refugees of the Revolu-
tions of 1848-and the public intellectuals educated in German universities in 
large numbers after 1870. Historians have already integrated German immi-
grants into the bourgeoning literature that traces how foreign ideas, events, and 
people influenced the American antislavery impulse and connects the U.S. Civil 
War to efforts to consolidate nation-states around the globe.16 Historians such as 
Daniel T. Rodgers and Andrew Zimmerman have also described how Germany 
featured in the late nineteenth century's promiscuous transnational sharing of 
interrelated ideas of empire, race, labor control, business regulation, and social 
safety nets in an industrializing world.17 In showing that events overseas reverber-
ated in American political culture during the intervening period of Reconstruc-
tion, this chapter builds on the work of historians such as Philip M. Katz, David 
Prior, and Gregory P. Downs.18 Most ambitiously, it gestures toward the contours 
of Thomas Bender's sweeping argument about global connections and contexts 
in A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History. Although actors at 
the time could not know it, the arms scandal marked a moment when ambitions 
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to secure "freedom in an age of nation-making" were yielding to struggles over 
how to administer government in an era of industrialization.19 
A brief survey of the activities of the German Forty-Eighters before 1870 shows 
that initially their transnational politics added momentum to the Republican 
efforts to extend the federal protection of black rights. Settling mainly in the 
North, they had converted their passion for German unity and individual rights 
into hostility toward slavery and support for the Union war effort. As Republican 
politicians, the exiles aspired to lead all of the 1.3 million odd German immi-
grants who made the United States home by 1860, but they ran up against the 
diversity of their community.20 Members of the substantial Catholic minority 
and residents of eastern states were especially likely to remain loyal Democrats. 
Nonetheless, Forty-Eighters attained standing among German Americans who 
were trying to define a place for themselves in a new country. At the same time, 
they won influence among Anglo-American Republicans who believed that 
immigrants were vital swing voters in tightly contested Midwestern elections.21 
German immigrants also owed their prominence in the Republican Party to 
the sense that their German connections granted them special insight into the 
United States. Before the rise of the Liberal Republican movement, Schurz and 
other Forty-Eighters in the Republican Party went out of their way to compare 
the country favorably to European states. They used their first-hand knowledge 
of states under dynastic rule to reinforce the ubiquitous Republican trope that 
slave societies resembled backward aristocracies.22 Although the Forty-Eighters 
certainly believed that slavery stood in the way of their chosen land realizing its 
own ideals, they held that it represented, as Schurz said in 1859, "the last deposi-
tories of the hopes of all true friends of humanity:'23 
During the 1860s, German-American Republicans used international com-
parison and appeals to ethnic superiority differently than Schurz would in 1872. 
Inspired by the spirit of 1848, they popularized the idea of the "freedom-loving 
German" who had been thwarted in Europe but crossed the Atlantic to stand 
against slavery. A St. Louis editor wrote on the eve of the Civil War that German 
Americans held a unique "mission" in the "present crisis" because they were "filled 
with more intensive concepts of freedom, with more expansive notions of hu-
manity than most peoples of the earth:'24 While such conceits could hardly stand 
up to scrutiny, they were nonetheless powerful.25 They guided moderate German 
Republicans toward black rights, and even German-American Democrats in the 
North began to embrace such ethnic claims. They were quicker than their native-
born colleagues to come around to emancipation and, later, black suffrage.26 
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After the war, leading German-American Republicans used their transna-
tional credentials to provide important encouragement to the laws and constitu-
tional amendments that promoted African American rights. Having completed 
his military service by the summer of 1865, Schurz famously toured southern 
states and found evidence to support the enfranchisement of black men. In 
his Report on the Condition of the South, Schurz focused on the "effect of the 
extension of the franchise to the colored people upon the development of free 
labor and upon the security of human rights in the South:'27 Some of Schurz's 
colleagues, speaking to a narrower, German-language audience, were more ex-
plicitly transnational in their pro-suffrage arguments. In stumping for Grant in 
the 1868 election, Forty-Eighter August Willich described black suffrage as the 
capstone of German Americans' global mission, telling Cleveland Germans that 
they must "continue to act for the dominance of the German spirit, in accordance 
with complete freedom:'28 The connection he made between German-American 
identity and black rights sounded plausible because African-American suffrage 
was gaining ground among Republican politicians between 1865 and 1870. But 
voting returns in state referenda tell a more nuanced story. German wards, even 
Republican-leaning ones, frequently disappointed Republican leaders.29 As Julia 
Brookins points out in Chapter 6 of this volume, German Texans cared more 
about national control than liberal laws. Schurz's waning interest in black suffrage 
after 1870 did not signify a complete reversal among his constituents. 
Using immigrant experiences to compare the United States to other coun-
tries was always a limited tool for dismantling racial inequality. Important lead-
ers constructed German-American ideals in a way that supported the interests 
of African Americans for the time being, but the transnational approach of the 
white immigrants had intrinsic weaknesses from the standpoint of Americans 
of color. Even at its most idealistic, the image the freedom-loving German was 
only ever tenuously connected to the lives of black southerners, who were far 
less important to Schurz than the immigrants upon whom he built a career. Ger-
man Americans' self-absorption made them unreliable allies, and so too did their 
preoccupation with events far across the Atlantic Ocean. The energy from the 
Revolutions of 1848 survived with surprising vigor in late 1860s America, but 
conditions in Europe were always subject to change. If unsuccessful uprisings 
could so forcefully shape how immigrants participated in American politics, 
what might come of a conventional land war with a traditional adversary? 
France declared war on Prussia in July of 1870, setting in motion events that 
would transform Europe and reconfigure German-American politics. Prussian 
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Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck was ready, eager even, for an armed confron-
tation. A military threat was just what he needed to convince smaller German 
states to unite under Prussian auspices, completing the complex and drawn out 
process of national consolidation. The German forces advanced rapidly, besieg-
ing Paris and capturing Emperor Louis Napoleon III on the battlefield by Sep-
tember. The French responded by declaring a republic and fighting on until their 
final defeat in January 1871. By that time, Wilhelm I of Prussia was emperor of the 
new Germany; Bismarck was its chancellor. 
Schurz's arms scandal was part of the American-and especially German-
American-response to the Franco-Prussian War. The recently laid Atlantic 
cable gave the European events an immediacy that prior conflagrations had 
lacked.30 Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes received a letter from an associate 
in New York informing him that "the war telegrams make immense excitement 
here[. A]s much as our own war:'31 Newspaper correspondents used the wires to 
dispatch updates on troop movements and sieges, while long-form descriptions 
of troop morale and supply networks still came by mail. Most American news-
paper editors matched the stream of information with commentary. They evalu-
ated the military strength of each side and contemplated the relative merits of 
the French Republic and the German Empire. Republicans, who were swayed by 
Prussia's Protestantism and an interest German immigrant votes, showed more 
sympathy toward the Germans than the Democrats. Napoleon III had earned 
Republican distrust when he encouraged the Confederacy with his invasion of 
Mexico during the Civil War.32 (At the time, General Grant had gone as far as 
facilitating the covert arming of the Juarist resistance to the French-supported 
government, an act Schurz could have turned to his political advantage in 1872 
ifhe had known ofit.33) When the Franco-Prussian War began, President Grant 
proclaimed American neutrality but told his minister to France, Elihu B. Wash-
burne, "Every unreconstructed rebel sympathizes with France, without excep-
tion, while the loyal element is almost as universally the other way?'34 Revealing 
his own sympathies, Grant charged Washburne with representing the Germans 
who were stranded in Paris at the outbreak of hostilities. 35 Grant's opponents in 
the Democratic Party, even leaders with solidly Unionist credentials, were in-
deed more likely to defend France. They cited its republican heritage and contri-
butions to the American Revolution, arguments that won more support after the 
declaration of the Third French Republic.36 
Among German Americans, there were few partisan divisions over the war 
itself. Not only did they see France as the aggressor, but they also welcomed the 
unification that had eluded the revolutionaries of 1848. In large cities and small 
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towns across the United States, thousands of German immigrants attended "sym-
pathy meetings:· At these and a host of demonstrations and fundraisers, Forty-
Eighters who had once fought Prussian troops thrilled at the prospect of German 
lands uniting under Bismarck's control.37 German-American Catholics disagreed 
with the Forty-Eighters on many things, but they joined the excitement, predict-
ing naively that Bismarck's Protestantism would not affect his administration.38 
There were only a few pockets of dissent from the general fervor. In some cities, 
Hanoverians and socialists warned of Bismarck's authoritarian tendencies. One 
radical working-class newspaper in New York, for example, was famous for its 
critique of German Americans' zeal for Bismarck's war. The Arbeiter-Union lost 
subscribers and folded in 1870, a fate that observers attributed to this position.39 
Schurz summed up the climate of opinion before a crowd in Chicago, stating, 
"The great soul of Germany, which for ages has haunted the history of the world 
like a specter, has finally found again a body mighty like herself."40 At this mo-
ment of intense optimism, most German Americans were willing to place their 
aspirations for Germany's future in the hands of Bismarck's government. 
German Americans did not endorse all of Bismarck's positions, but the eu-
phoria of 1870-71 carried with it new priorities relevant to the arms scandal, the 
Liberal Republican movement, and a new kind of transnational outlook in the 
United States. Wishful thinking among the immigrants led them to accentuate 
the positive aspects of German governance. Hoping that individual rights and 
democratic decision-making, the two main priorities of 1848, would follow in 
due course, German-American leaders turned their attention to Prussia's edu-
cational success, military might, and incorruptible civil service.41 Missouri's St. 
Charles Demokrat, for example, attributed the triumph of German troops over 
the French to a comprehensive system of public education superior to that of the 
United States.42 The German armies won editorial praise for their training, order, 
and efficiency, although a few German Americans warned of the risk that such 
admiration could slide into an endorsement of militarism.43 Regardless of these 
cautions, the exuberant war news that filled every German-American newspaper 
for months argued strongly for German prowess. When France became a repub-
lic, immigrants had to explain why they believed that "Germany is today, without 
bearing the name, closer in reality to the concept of the true essence of a free 
state than Paris with all its republicanism:' The faith that "minor institutions" 
expressed German capacities formed part of the answer. 44 Cincinnati Republican 
J. B. Stallo told a crowd in September 1870, "No republic can be made overnight 
merely by proclaiming it; it must be developed slowly and gradually within a 
Volk, in its minor institutions, in its everyday actions and intentions:'45 The de-
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tails of administration were as important as electoral systems. The encouraging 
lessons of 1870 seemed as significant to German immigrants as the cautionary 
tales of 1848, and the sale of American arms to the French became an opportu-
nity to communicate them. 
On October 4, 1870, reports that the French were purchasing American guns 
made it out of the shipping news columns and onto the front pages of the New 
York newspapers.46 The New-York Tribune ran a dramatic description of dock-
workers loading crates of small arms into a French Steamship Company vessel 
behind an improvised screen.47 The following day the paper disclosed that some 
of the boxes had been labeled with the names of U.S. arsenals and that the deliv-
eries had been commissioned "by the direct order" of the new republican gov-
ernment ofFrance.48 Despite the cloak-and-dagger tone of the reporting, the Tri-
bune maintained that the rifle sales were consistent with American policy, which 
allowed individuals and companies to continue to sell arms to belligerents on a 
private basis.49 The administration could have agreed, asserting that it bore no 
responsibility for what private traders did after they bought arms from the gov-
ernment. Instead, it claimed that the United States was not selling arms to the 
French or the Prussians either udirectly or indirect!Y:'50 The statement sounded 
like an outright denial of the Tribune account. 
Many German Americans demanded clearer answers to the questions raised 
by Horace Greeley's Tribune and other papers from late 1870 to early 1871. Im-
migrants in the Democratic camp naturally added aiding the French to their list 
of complaints against the sitting president. It provided a good rejoinder to Ger-
man Republicans who capitalized on their party's rhetorical support for the Ger-
man cause. Oswald Ottendorfer, New York's imposing Democratic editor and 
politician, sounded more incensed than Schurz ever would. In December 1870, 
he wrote, "The freedom-loving German people reached out the hand of broth-
erhood [during the Civil War], and now America delivers to their archenemy 
weapons with which German warriors will be destroyed and a brutal war will 
be prolonged. This ingratitude will be avenged sooner or later:•si But Ottendor-
fer's vehemence was atypical. Although the editor of the Democratic Cincinnati 
Volksfreund was no fan of Grant, he wrote more calmly that the affair merited 
"serious consideration:'52 Another Democrat, Milwaukee editor and state assem-
blyman Peter V. Deuster, asked the Wisconsin legislature to censure the presi-
dent, but his newspaper, the Milwaukee Seebote, devoted only a few paragraphs 
to the proposal.53 
News of the shipments to France also provoked some German-American 
Republicans. Hermann Raster edited the Illinois Staatszeitung in Chicago, and 
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his service to Grant would soon earn him a post as local collector of internal 
revenue. In January 1871, Raster's paper printed an editorial that stated that the 
administration's position was "wrong (fa/sch J, and must be condemned by every 
true American:· Yet the editor perceived a relatively lackluster response from 
German Americans. He complained, "It has not occurred to anyone to do any-
thing else about the matter other than holding forth behind a beer glass:'54 Raster 
experienced the same sort of frustrations as the Fenain leaders trying to rouse 
Irish immigrants to fight the British Empire in Chapter 5. The readers of the 
Illinois Staatszeitung were not Germans but German Americans. In January 1871, 
some Chicago Germans did organize a public meeting, one of a flicker of protests 
in cities including Detroit, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., which 
petitioned for an end to any sales. s; 
Schurz felt the pressure by January 1870, but as he told his business partner, 
"raising the matter in Congress" was "a somewhat sensitive thing" in "the prevail-
ing circumstances:' The German-born freshman senator, who had already an-
tagonized Grant, did not want to question American actions when the German 
Confederation had not lodged a public protest.56 Schurz's St. Louis newspaper, 
the Westliche Post, assured readers he would act, but the action occurred behind 
the scenes.57 On Saturday, January 21, after getting nowhere with Secretary of 
War William Belknap, he paid a call to the secretary of state, Hamilton Fish.58 
Just two days later, he received a "personal and confidential" letter from Fish. The 
president, Fish confirmed, had ordered Belknap to "suspend all sales:'59 German-
language newspapers covered the halt, but English-language newspapers hardly 
mentioned it.60 By this point, French capitulation was the main story. The ship-
ments and the war were over. 
About a year would pass-from early 1871 to early 1872-before the arms sales 
reemerged as the arms scandal. New suggestions of bribery meant that German-
American charges were more significant to the movement gathering against 
the Grant administration. A twist came when a diplomat, and not a German 
but a French one, Charles Adolphe de Pineton, the Marquis de Chambrun, ap-
proached Senator Charles Sumner shortly before Christmas 1871 with details of 
a French investigation into irregularities in arms purchasing during the recent 
European war.61 Although the distinguished Radical Republican from Massachu-
setts remained strongly committed to African-American rights, Sumner too had 
fallen out with Grant, and he was happy to share the new information with his 
friend Carl Schurz. By the end of January 1872, Schurz and Sumner were working 
together to sift through the evidence Chambrun had collected and the press had 
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wind of them "smelling around:'62 It was Sumner who introduced a resolution 
that called for an investigation on February 12, 1872. 
Thinly veiled allegations that individuals in the War Department had taken 
money under the table in return for violating neutrality law drove two critical 
weeks of Senate debate on the international standing of the United States and 
administrative propriety. Direct evidence of bribes never surfaced, but Sumner 
cited Ordnance Bureau records that failed to account for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. If highly placed employees had diverted assets, perhaps bribes had 
induced them to make unauthorized sales. But this line of inquiry was so poorly 
grounded that Sumner and Schurz backed away from it within a few days. They 
had simply misunderstood the charts.63 Schurz then took over, focusing on evi-
dence that Secretary Belknap had learned that Remington & Sons was "an agent" 
of France in mid-October 1870, presumably shortly after his office denied trading 
with the country, and therefore cut off sales from the Ordnance Bureau to the 
firm.64 Schurz considered indirect sales to Remington's firm using proxies be-
tween October 1870 and January 1871 just as reprehensible as the original trans-
actions. Calling the idea that the Ordnance Bureau had exercised "reasonable 
diligence" in vetting dealers a "transparent farce:' Schurz quoted letters indicat-
ing that Samuel Remington had personally intervened to have cartridges manu-
factured in order to facilitate a deal that supposedly had nothing to do with his 
firm.65 Incredulous, Schurz exclaimed, "There is an impression prevailing in this 
country that somewhere in this Government there sits 'a military ring:"66 
Before Schurz's numerous opponents got to the implications of his assault, 
they addressed the specific charges. They said that the secretary of war had never 
knowingly sold arms to France and contended that the Ordnance Bureau bore 
minimal responsibility for scrutinizing arms dealers.67 Matthew H. Carpenter of 
Wisconsin went so far as to argue that the United States government could trade 
in munitions without compromising its neutrality, but few senators agreed with 
his reading of international law, probably thinking of the arbitration still pend-
ing in the Alabama Claims.68 The United States was pursuing damages because 
Britain had failed to prevent ships such the Alabama from being built and sold 
to the Confederacy during the Civil War. In a novel step, the two countries had 
agreed to submit the issue and other disputes between the United States and 
Great Britain to an international tribunal. With the Alabama Claims still under 
consideration, Schurz pointed out, Americans did not want to appear to condone 
the equipping of belligerents in-and especially by-neutral countries.69 
Yet during the second half of February 1872, debate in the Senate ranged far 
beyond the case's specifics to touch on the American place in the world and the 
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future of Republicans' southern policy. Senators and the public understood the 
scandal in the context of the Schurz's leadership of the solidifying Liberal Re-
publican movement. During 1870 and especially 1871, his longstanding distaste 
for "party despotism" and preexisting inclination to treat former Confederates 
with magnanimity had come to dominate his politics.70 When he first entered 
the Senate in December 1869, he had introduced a civil service reform bill, and 
his interest in such legislation increased as Grant made poor appointments, re-
moved Schurz supporters from office, and failed to disentangle the administra-
tion of government from party politics.71 Men such as Senator Lyman Trumbull 
of Illinois, E. L. Godkin at The Nation, and Horace White at the Chicago Tribune 
shared Schurz's belief that outright corruption was connected to both the power 
of unqualified voters and federal overreach in subsidizing business, enacting tar-
iffs, and enforcing black rights. Liberal Republicans issued a call for a national 
convention weeks before Sumner's resolution, so the scandal communicated, ad-
vanced, and shaped their program at a critical time.72 
In particular, the arms scandal reflected the ideas of the German-American 
Midwesterners who were both leading and following Schurz out of the Repub-
lican Party, away from active support for black rights, and toward new trans-
national comparisons. Disgruntled immigrants had been indispensable to the 
Liberal Republican movement from its early days in Miss.ouri. About a third of 
the delegates to the Republican state convention of 1870, men mostly from St. 
Louis and other heavily German counties, had bolted to.join a competing con-
vention chaired by Schurz.73 The movement's spread left Grant with few high-
profile German-American backers in the Midwest by the end of 1871. Chicago's 
Hermann Raster and Ohio's Lieutenant Governor Jacob Muller held out, as did 
scattered minor leaders, but important German-speaking Republicans such as 
Gustav Koerner, Caspar Butz, and Friedrich Hecker of Illinois, and J. B. Stallo, 
Friedrich Hassaurek, and August Thieme of Ohio were preparing to leave their 
party.74 Schurz later observed that German Americans "had joined [the Liberal 
Republicans] in Masse [sic]" and "in some Western states they formed the whole 
backbone of the movement."75 At the national level, the proportion of Liberal 
Republicans among German Americans was higher than the proportion of Ger-
man Americans among Liberal Republicans. But one of the reasons for Schurz's 
stature in the party was the belief that he represented an indispensable group 
of voters.76 
Since 1870, German-American Liberal Republicans had been developing a 
reform sensibility that incorporated their reactions to events in Europe and the 
original news of the arms shipments. When Schurz became the public face of the 
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arms scandal in February 1872, he had already been party to an eighteen-month 
discussion of administrative propriety that was fueled by unfavorable compari-
sons between the United States and other governments, especially the rising Ger-
man state. In 1871, the editor of the St. Charles Demokrat, which had until recently 
supported Republican candidates, worried that corruption meant that the United 
States was "losing respect in the eyes of all other civilized nations~n The Demo-
cratic Cincinnati Volksfreund lamented, "Corruption, special interest legislation, 
and privileges, characterize our public life in such a conspicuous way that we 
must blush when we hold up our current state of affairs, republican in name only, 
as an example for other nations to imitate:'78 Also in Cincinnati, maverick Re-
publican Friedrich Hassaurek was annoyed that Americans feigned to have "the 
best government under the sun:'79 Another Forty-Eighter and discontented Re-
publican, Friedrich Hecker, delivered a speech on the German-language lecture 
circuit in 1871 and 1872, which Schurz's Westliche Post published weeks before 
the scandal broke. Hecker maintained, "In no civilized to half-civilized land of 
the world, not even in Turkey, is an unlimited administration in relation to the 
naming and removal of officials laid in the hands of an individual [the president] 
as here:· He was, in fact, critical of the Prussian system, too, which made him 
an outlier in the German-American community. Holding the United States to a 
higher standard than the German Empire, he remarked that the U.S. civil service 
was better fitted to a "princely state" than a "people's state:·ao Like most German 
Americans, he preferred the United States, but Hecker presented it as an imper-
fect country grappling with common problems. 
Standing in the Senate, Schurz built the arms scandal on the foundation of 
German Americans' critical comparisons, but he found it unnecessary to detail 
them. His underlying complaint was that American corruption had deprived 
Prussia of the respect it deserved in international dealings. In relatively few 
words, he signaled to German Americans that he shared their perspective and re-
assured other Americans that foreign practices were no threat. Schurz stipulated 
th . . d d "l"b " d" bt,·can pr1·nciples" but also-at 1mm1grants were evote to 1 erty an repu • 
" t na1 He notably spoke 
and here lay the stress of the sentence- honest governmen · 
. . ,, f: re frequently than he 
of upholdmg "the honor of the Amencan name ar mo 
. . d "M country right or wrong; 
cited any German considerations.82 When he sa1 , Y th U ·t d 
if right to be kept right; if wrong to be set right;' he was talking ~bout e : 0:n 
States. u Yet he also declared, "I certainly am not ashamed of havmgbspttlrunfig Ids of 
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Schurz spoke of origins, not allegiances, but the statement demonstrated his on-
going political engagement with Germany. Schurz defended the empire when 
Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and Roscoe Conkling of New York speculated that 
the allegations might "poison Prussian minds" against the United States right as 
Wilhelm I was about to sit on a tribunal to adjudicate one of the disputes with 
Britain related to the Alabama Claims. Schurz retorted that "mean, miserable, 
personal motives" did not drive the "great Government" of Germany.85 
Schurz's rhetorical defense of Germany had a policy corollary in Liberal Re-
publican initiatives to institute civil service reforms to prevent the sort of cor-
ruption that they thought must have caused the arms scandal. Congress had 
debated several bills that included examinations and merit-based promotion 
standards like those that had developed in Prussia and other German states since 
the eighteenth century and in Britain since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 
1854.86 Back in 1865, Republican Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes had cited Brit-
ish, French, and Prussian precedents when he introduced an unsuccessful civil 
service reform bill, and in 1872, Horace White at the Chicago Tribune described 
the Liberal Republicans' desired system as "English or Prussian" in a letter to 
Schurz.87 Schurz and others had strong domestic arguments for reform, so they 
did not make foreign references the mainstay of the English-language debate. 88 It 
was only the beginning of a the transition from a politics of rights and represen-
tation in which most Americans considered themselves frontrunners to a politics 
of administration with international leadership up for debate. 
In February 1872, some senators made the political risks of Schurz's compari-
sons clear when they equated it with disloyalty. Frederick Frelinghuysen of New 
Jersey said that after reading part of one ofSchurz's speeches to German Ameri-
cans he "could plainly see the chord of sympathy that ran and vibrated between 
the speaker and his auditors. I could see that the common bond of union be-
tween them was their own, their native land, the fatherland as the speaker called 
his home:' Frelinghuysen pointedly stated that Americans "have a sensitiveness 
in behalf of the honor of this country equal at least to the sensitiveness of Ger-
mans for the national rights of Germany:'89 Senator Carp.enter, who represented 
the very German state of Wisconsin, was more hostile. He brought up the idea of 
apologizing to Prussia, which no one had advocated, so that he could say that he 
saw "humiliation" in "voluntarily prostrating ourselves before a foreign Power:· 
He generously "acquitted" Schurz of"want of patriotism;' but warned ominously 
that if a senator "is not able to cast off his allegiance to his native land:' perhaps 
naturalization law ought to be changed.90 
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Yet for all the attacks on Schurz, most senators joined their colleague in prais-
ing German Americans and the new German Empire. Carpenter aside, even 
Grant's supporters accepted the idea that incorruptible German immigrants made 
upstanding Americans. They flattered immigrant voters in hopes of dissuading 
them from leaving the party. Morton, for example, insisted, "[T]he Germans 
of this country do not belong to anybody. They cannot be carried in anybody's 
breeches pockets. I do not care how capacious those pockets are .... They cannot 
be led from one party to another at the whim or caprice of politicians:'91 No one 
challenged Schurz's positive depiction of Germany. Morton, Conkling, and Fre-
linghuysen, three of his main opponents, all spoke respectfully of the new coun-
try, instead fretting that what they saw as Schurz's antics would alienate leaders 
that Americans admired.92 All this was in keeping with Grant's statement to Con-
gress the previous year, which complimented the German people and compared 
the German Empire to the United States.93 Republican senators would have read 
the approving accounts of Germany in their partisan newspapers and especially 
in the periodicals now aligning with the Liberal Republicans.94 Bismarck did not 
beguile Republicans, but they anticipated that his empire might incorporate what 
they considered the best of German traits and they treated it with a respect they 
had not accorded its forerunners. The resulting impression was that the United 
States and Germany belonged to a select community of states that were roughly 
equal. Just as they might arbitrate each other's disputes, they would attentively 
observe and evaluate each other's achievements. 
No one who followed the scandal could miss the relevance of international 
standing and administrative probity to the domestic issues that have occupied 
scholars of the post-war United States. Liberal Republicans connected outright 
malfeasance to the active-they would say unconstitutionally overzealous-en-
forcement of the Reconstruction acts and amendments. During 1871, Schurz had 
opposed the Ku Klux Klan Act on the grounds that empowering the president to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment might lead to abuses of executive power. He 
supported rather symbolic bills to grant amnesty to the few former Confeder-
ates whom the Fourteenth Amendment still barred from holding office.95 Right 
before the arms debate, Schurz had spoken against Sumner's efforts to amend 
an amnesty bill to include a provision outlawing racial discrimination in access 
to various public accommodations.96 In a substantial comment in the Senate, 
Schurz said that the main question confronting Americans since the ratification 
of the Fifteenth Amendment was how to "secure good and honest government 
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to alJ:'97 Schurz repeated several times that "nothing could be further from my 
intention than to cast a slur on the colored people of the South:' but he regretted 
that replacing "intelligent and experienced" voters with and "ignorant and inex-
perienced" ones had led to what he saw as maladministration, which in his mind 
had exacerbated Ku Klux Klan outrages.98 
Less than a week later, while discussing the Ordnance Bureau sales, other Lib-
eral Republicans alluded to the link Schurz perceived between corruption and 
Republican actions in the South. Lyman Trumbull of Illinois believed Americans 
would understand his reference to "the history of the enormous frauds which 
have been perpetrated in nearly all the reconstructed States" without further ex-
planation.99 Thomas W Tipton of Nebraska said Republicans had closed ranks 
ever since "the discovery was made that the President's body guard intended to 
make the first object of their reconstruction laws the perpetuation in power of 
the Republican Party in the South:'100 Discussing corruption meant discussing 
southern policy. 
Republicans loyal to Grant argued that anything that undermined the ad-
ministration would result in victories for Democrats, who intended to erode the 
gains African Americans had made. Morton recounted the history of Missouri, 
where many more Democrats than Liberal Republicans had been elected to the 
Missouri legislature in 1870. The Liberal Republican governor, Benjamin Gratz 
Brown, had begun to support unabashedly racist Democrats, while the state leg-
islature sent Frank Blair, Jr., to the Senate. Blair was famous for running a par-
ticularly nasty anti-black campaign for the vice presidency in 1868, and Morton 
now dubbed him Schurz's "official offspring:'101 As if to underline the potential 
cost of fraternizing with Democrats, Blair dismissed Republican accounts of Klan 
violence as "the foulest calumny ever perpetrated or circulated upon or against a 
helpless people" the day before Schurz's big speech on the arms deals.'02 
Thomas Nast, the country's leading political cartoonist, illustrated the Repub-
lican interpretation of the racial import of a scandal that alleged corruption on 
the world stage. Nast had himself emigrated from Bavaria as a child, but the 
New Yorker stood aloof from German-American politics. His nativity seems to 
have served mostly to free him to attack Schurz with more gusto than Anglo-
Americans dared display.'03 One ofNast's many cartoons about the scandal, "Me-
phistopheles at Work for Destruction: A Bid for the German Vote:' ran in Har-
per's Weekly in March 1872. In it, Schurz plays the devil from Goethe's celebrated 
tragedy Faust, tempting a wary Charles Sumner to abandon his racially egalitar-
ian principles. The lanky German American leans over Sumner to guide his hand 
as he drafts his controversial Senate resolution, and behind his bent back is a sign 
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Figure 4.1. Thomas Nast depicts Carl Schurz as the devil from Goethe's Faust, trying to 
tempt Charles Sumner to abandon his racial egalitarianism. Harper's Weekly, March 9, 
1872, 185. 
reading, "WANTED: NEW PLANS FOR BREAKING DOWN THE ADMINISTRATION" and 
"WANTED: PLANS TO STIR UP BAD FEELINGS BETWEEN EUROPEAN POWERS AND 
THE UNITED STATEs:' Sumner, whose large figure sits at the center of the page, 
gazes uncertainly over his shoulder at a female representation of the American 
republic. She is poised above large volumes entitled "Sumner's Anti-Slavery Rec-
ord" and "Sumner's Rebellion Record:' Nast thought the scandal baseless and 
Schurz's motives base, but worst of all was how it imperiled black rights.104 
A German-American senator made a cause celebre of the arms sales because 
they involved partisan power and national honor, but those same qualities checked 
the scandal's progress. Anglo-American reactions followed the predictable lines 
of party affiliation. Democrats and Liberal Republicans located evidence of the 
corruption and partisan arrogance, while Republicans saw an underhanded 
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and potentially disloyal attempt to derail what they had gained in the South.105 
Ethnicity changed the equation somewhat for German Americans. Immigrants 
from around the country wrote to Schurz to thank him for bringing a "German" 
approach to American corruption. One Ohioan enthused: ''.After I read your 
great speech on the 'arms hagglers' in the Cin. Volksblatt through very carefully, 
I feel compelled & spontaneously drawn to congratulate you from the bottom of 
my true German heart."106 But the exuberance of the letters contrasted with the 
circumspection of the German-language press. The more of a spectacle the scan-
dal became, the more reluctant editors seemed to be to identify as Germans. The 
relationship between the United States and Germany had to be handled carefully. 
Democrat Peter Deuster had brought the arms scandal to the attention of the 
Wisconsin legislature in 1871, but now his Milwaukee Seebote commented tersely 
that Democrats played the most "honorable" role in the Senate debate by staying 
quiet.107 Raster in Chicago, who still supported Grant, agreed with Schurz that an 
investigation was vital, but he disapproved of Schurz's divisive grandstanding.108 
Schurz's most enthusiastic supporters were Liberal Republicans such as Friedrich 
Hecker and August Thieme.109 
Ultimately, the partisan nature of the wrangling and the imperative of na-
tional face-saving prevented the Senate investigation, and a smaller one in the 
House, from achieving more than adding to the general impression that Grant's 
administration was an imperious one. Members of the Senate committee were 
exclusively Republican except for one Democrat, John W Stevenson of Ken-
tucky. Schurz himself participated, but as a witness and an unofficial member. 
In a canny political move, Republican senators had given the committee the ad-
ditional responsibility of investigating senators' possible entanglements with for-
eign powers, and Schurz could not investigate himself.11° Committee members 
grilled him at length on his interactions with foreign informants, apparently to 
raise suspicions about his loyalty. Chairman Hannibal Hamlin of Maine was 
thinking of Schurz when he provocatively asked Sumner, "Would you deem it 
the duty of a patriotic Senator to inquire of foreign legations in relation to ques-
tions which would tend to put his own Government in the wrong with other 
governments .. . ?"lll When Schurz acted as interrogator, Secretary Belknap and 
other witnesses from the War Department defended themselves and the Grant 
administration, testifying that any irregular practices only made money for the 
government.112 The officials stubbornly denied knowingly selling to direct agents 
of foreign powers.m The committee took this position in its final report. Any 
infractions on the government's part were minor technicalities, nothing to bring 
"dishonor" upon the country or "officers of the Government;' it concluded.114 
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Schurz fired back by reiterating his transnational framing of corruption one 
last time in the Senate at the end of May. Agreeing with Stevenson that the sales 
were "in direct violation of the letter and spirit" of the law, he described the inad-
equacies of the investigation.115 The speech began by likening Grant's "defiance" 
of public opinion to that of "profligate European aristocracies;' which clearly did 
not include modern Germany. He commended German immigrants for remon-
strating against the sales and spoke at great length of "the honor and the inter-
national standing" of the United States. Senators again heard about the Alabama 
Claims and the importance of "favorable public opinion abroad."116 Perhaps be-
cause it was repetitive, Schurz's speech received only perfunctory coverage in the 
press, and the broader issue of corruption subsumed the scandal in the fall cam-
paign.'17 It is hard to see the scandal's conclusion as anything but anticlimactic. 
Yet even if Schurz's work on the scandal did not result in prosecutions, it was, 
like the Liberal Republican movement more broadly, significant because it influ-
enced American political culture. The Liberal Republican part in helping to spell 
the "doom of Reconstruction" bears emphasizing. Republicans began to appro-
priate Liberal ideas just weeks after the third party nominated Horace Greeley 
for the presidency. Congress finally passed an amnesty bill, and then in June, 
Republicans placed civil service reform and liberal economic policies on their 
national platform.118 Greeley became more active in criticizing Republican sup-
port for African Americans once Democrats endorsed him, a change that also 
affected his opponent. Grant was reelected, but he began a slow disengagement 
from the South. The president gave Democrats patronage positions, backed off 
prosecuting violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and withheld aid from the 
victims of racially motivated attacks such as those that stained Mississippi's elec-
tions in 1875.119 In the settlement that decided the 1876 election, Rutherford B. 
Hayes made it known that the military would stand down from the role it had as-
sumed in the South since the war. The new president showed his debts to LiberaJ 
Republicans by selecting Carl Schurz to serve as secretary of the interior. Once 
he oversaw his own department, Schurz had his chance to implement a system of 
efficiency reports, examinations, and merit-based promotion.
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would make no sense to see them as ambassadors for the ideas of German phi-
losopher G. W. F. Hegel, whose work blurred the distinction between the people 
and the state.122 Yet German-American Liberal Republicans implicitly believed 
in the practical benefits of insulating officeholders from parties and markets by 
inducting them into a self-regulating group with its own criteria for inclusion 
and advancement. Their campaign to make a scandal of the arms sales both bor-
rowed principles from European nations and negatively compared the United 
States to those nations. 
The immigrants who turned optimistically from the reference point of the 
Revolutions of 1848 to the consolidating Germany of 1871 prepared the way for a 
generation of public intellectuals looking for solutions to the problems of indus-
trialization. After 1870, the number of Americans attending German universities 
rose dramatically to several thousand per decade, with a peak in the 1890s pre-
ceding a rapid decline.123 Influential student sojourners such as Richard T. Ely and 
Henry C. Adams, and later W. E. B. Du Bois and Lincoln Stetfans forged trans-
national bonds and exchanged political ideas. Ely, the important economist who 
features in Daniel Rodgers's seminal description of these developments, wrote an 
article in 1883 that showed how well the arms scandal augured the future.124 De-
scribing the Prussian civil service for California's Overland Monthly, Ely included 
a nod to the republican example of Rome and the need for "public and private 
virtues;' but he found in Prussia the sort of procedures that he believed could 
institutionalize such ideals. With a judicious eye on Bismarck's recent retalia-
tions against dissenting public servants, he set out why scholars considered "the 
Prussian civil service the most admirable of which we have any knowledge:'125 
The piece contained nothing to surprise the immigrants involved in the arms 
scandal. They would have been glad to see their ideas spreading. The decade fol-
lowing the Civil War was not a hiatus between an era of transatlantic radicals and 
nationalists who criticized Europe's governments and an era of interconnected 
reformers and experts who were open to the lessons of Europe; it was a pivot. 
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